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1987 SURVEY OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE COURTS
Carl H. Esbeck *
The purpose of this survey is to note important caselaw developments in the state and lower federal courts concerning religious liberty. Purposely omitted are the widely reported United States
Supreme Court opinions, as well as cases where the Court has granted
review during the 1987-88 term. The focus here is to collect significant cases that may otherwise escape broad attention. Only the facts
and rationale of each court's decision is recorded. No editorial comment on the merits of these cases is intended.
I.

LABOR PRACTICES

&

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Bollenbach v. Board of Education of Monroe- Woodbury Central
School District, 659 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1987).
A United States district court concluded that the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment by altering its bus routes to ensure that only male
bus drivers were assigned to routes servicing male students of the
United Talmudic Academy (UTA). The court found that requiring
students of UTA to accept transportation from female drivers did
burden their religious beliefs under the free exercise clause. However,
such a burden was justified by the compelling state interest in avoiding a violation of the establishment clause. Further, the court determined that the prohibition on altering bus routes was the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the state's objective of avoiding the
appearance of a symbolic union between the school district and the
religious sect.
The suit was brought by a group of female bus drivers who challenged the school district's assignment of male bus drivers with less
seniority to routes servicing UTA located in the Village of Kirvas
Joel. The female drivers brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D., 1974, Cornell University;
B.S., 1971, Iowa State University. The author would like to thank the Center for Law &
Religious Freedom whose monthly digest of cases, the Religious Freedom Reporter, was invaluable in compiling this annual survey. Substantial portions of the summaries herein are reprinted from the Reporter with permission of the Center.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief.
The village is populated exclusively by Hasidic Jews of the
Satmar sect, who follow the tenets of the Hasidic religion prohibiting
social interaction between the sexes. In furtherance of that belief,
UTA maintains separate schools for males and females.
The school district began providing transportation to Hasidic
students during the 1978-79 school year under N.Y. Educ. Law
§ 3635(1) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1983). UTA officials advised the
school district that their religious tenets prevented the students from
boarding a bus driven by a woman. Thereafter, the school district
attempted to accommodate the needs of the Hasidim by assigning a
male driver out of the seniority order.
An arbitrator ordered the district to comply with the seniority
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement without granting
special exceptions to UTA routes. Thereafter, UTA obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the district from removing male
bus drivers and enjoining implementation of the arbitrator's decision.
It altered its school day to enable male drivers to transport male students without violating the collective bargaining agreement. The bus
drivers then filed suit in federal court alleging sex discrimination.
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, three female bus drivers were assigned to UTA routes for the 1986-87 school
year. Thereafter, UTA filed a complaint against the school district,
alleging violation of the free exercise clause and § 3635 of the N.Y.
Educ. Law. As a result of the male students' refusal to board the bus
operated by female drivers, the bus routes were suspended early in the
1986-87 school year.
The court said that the state was constitutionally required to assume a posture of neutral accommodation in regard to religion. However, it cautioned that the state must take care not to accommodate to
the point where it is engaged in the impermissible activity of lending
direct support to a religious organization.
With regard to this case, the court noted that public transportation of parochial school students had been upheld in Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). However, it cited dicta from the
First Circuit's decision in Members ofJamestown School Committee v.
Schmidt, 699 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983), stating that not all busing programs were constitutional. In Jamestown,
the First Circuit commented that in Everson the transportation of sec-
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tarian students had been part of a general program neutrally provided
in common with all school children. The court concluded that a busing program failed to pass constitutional muster "where a forbidden
purpose or impermissible primary effect is indicated or where palatable disparity has spread significant divisiveness along religious lines."
Jamestown, 699 F.2d at 10. In such a case, the court said, the "busing
program will have ceased to be a general program of secular benefits
neutrally available to all and will have crossed the line from providing
a remote and incidental benefit to offering a direct and immediate benefit to religion." Id.
Applying the three prongs of the Lemon test, the court initially
found that the district's assignment of using only male bus drivers to
drive male UTA students was made pursuant to a secular purpose of
"ensuring that all children, regardless of their religion are transported
to school." The court commented that the state had a "legitimate
secular interest in providing bus service in such a manner that all children, including Hasidic children, can take advantage of it."
However, the court found that the attempted accommodation
had the impermissible effect of creating a symbolic link between the
state and religion. Quoting School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985), the court stated that "impermissible advancement occurred not only when the state directly funds efforts to indoctrinate children in specific religious beliefs, but also when the state
fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with
those of religious denominations." It found that the appropriate inquiry under the effects test was whether the symbolic union between
religion and state was likely to be perceived by adherents as an endorsement and by nonadherents as disapproval of their religious
choices. It found the inquiry to be especially significant where children in their formative years were likely to be influenced by the
symbolism.
The court noted special attention to that union had been given by
the Second Circuit in Parents'Associationof P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803
F.2d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 1986). In Quinones, the Second Circuit determined that a plan which permitted female students from a Hasidic
school to receive special education classes in a separate and segregated
area of a public school taught only by Yiddish-speaking women was
invalid under the religious effect prong of the Lemon test. The court
in Bollenbach found that providing only male drivers would transform the neutral service of transportation into a means "for promoting the Hasidic tenet that boys must not be in contact with women."
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The court also noted that the excessive entanglement prong of
the Lemon test would be violated. It reasoned that excessive entanglement could arise from the need to substantially increase the
number of administrative contacts among the district, the union, and
UTA in order to coordinate and maintain busing services for the male
students.
The court said that requiring the Hasidim to choose between violating their religious beliefs and foregoing the public benefit of free
bus transportation burdened their religious belief in a manner similar
to the state's actions in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,
450 U.S. 707 (1980); and Hobbie v. Unemployment Commission of
Florida, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987). However, the court found that the
burden was justified by the state's compelling interest in avoiding a
violation of the establishment clause. Additionally, the court reasoned that the state's interest in removing "any indication of a symbolic link between the state and the Hasidic sect, leads to the
inescapable conclusion that no less restrictive alternative accommodations were feasible in this case." Therefore, it found no free exercise
clause violation.
Finally, the court concluded that the female bus drivers had
stated a sufficient cause of action under the Title VII. It found that
the discrimination here was neither excused by business necessity nor
necessitated by a bona fide occupational qualification.
Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. Mar. 20,
1987).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a federal district court's ruling that Title VII and the first amendment precluded it
from deciding whether a female professor should be employed to
teach theology at Marquette University. However, the appellate
court vacated the lower court's dismissal of the professor's pendent
state law claim, which alleged that Marquette's refusal to hire her
because of her views on abortion violated the Wisconsin common law
of academic freedom and the university's own policies regarding academic freedom.
Marjorie Maguire filed an employment discrimination suit
against Marquette claiming that it refused to hire here as an associate
professor of theology because of her sex and because of the school's
perception of her views on abortion. Marquette had filed a motion for
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partial summary judgment, arguing that its policy of giving preference
to Jesuits did not constitute illegal sex discrimination, because being a
Jesuit was a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of
theology professor at a Jesuit university.
While the summary judgment motion was pending, Dr. Maguire
filed a motion to supplement her complaint on the basis of information uncovered during the course of discovery. The supplemental
complaint added a pendent claim for breach of the Wisconsin law of
academic freedom. Maguire argued that her academic freedom cause
of action alleged that the university misperceived her views on the
matter of the theology of abortion and on the public policy of allowing abortion in a pluralistic society. Maguire contends that the
relationship between the two views substantially motivated the university to refuse to hire her in its theology department. Marquette
filed an answer to Maguire's supplemental complaint, contending that
the white male appointed to the position possessed superior qualifications. However, Marquette further maintained that even if the university had found Maguire's academic record competitive, her
employment would have been rejected because of her perceived hostility to the institutional church and its teachings, and to the mission of
Marquette University. The district court entered an order dismissing
Maguire's complaint for what it termed a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit, however, determined that the district court
clearly had subject matter jurisdiction of Maguire's Title VII complaint. The Seventh Circuit found that what the district court actually held was that with regard to Maguire's claim of sex
discrimination, Marquette was exempt from Title VII under the provision which permits a university "to hire and employ employees of a
particular religion" if it is "in whole or substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(2). The appellate court agreed with the district court's
decisions to construe this exemption to cover the hiring decisions
made in the theology department of a Catholic university and that the
first amendment precluded the court from questioning Marquette's
determination that Maguire's theological beliefs were hostile to traditional Catholic doctrine.
At the same time, the Seventh Circuit stated that it did not have
to determine whether Marquette qualified as a religious employer
under the terms of the exemption, and, if so, whether the exemption
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covered the type of hiring decision involved in the present case. The
appellate court noted that the case could be resolved on the narrower
ground that Maguire simply had failed to make out a valid claim of
sex discrimination under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit cited McDonnell-DouglasCorp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-805 (1973), for the
proposition that where the defendant has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the prospective employee, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving that the reasons advanced by
the employer were a pretext, that a motivating or substantial factor in
the defendant's decision was discrimination, and that but for that discrimination the plaintiff would have been appointed.
After dismissing Maguire's Title VII claim, the district court
proceeded to review the merits of her pendent state law academic
freedom claim. The district court dismissed this claim on two
grounds. First, it reasoned that the Title VII exemption for religious
employers and the first amendment prohibited a federal court from
examining the hiring decisions made by the theology department at
Marquette. Second, the court ruled that Maguire had failed to produce any authority for the proposition that either Wisconsin law or
the policies of Marquette extended the principles of academic freedom
to hiring decisions.
Although the Seventh Circuit agreed that Wisconsin law in no
way limited the right of a private university to reject otherwise qualified applicants for positions as professors because of their opinions
and beliefs, it determined that the district court erred in reaching the
merits of Maguire's pendent claim. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that the district court failed to articulate any pressing reasons for retaining jurisdiction over Maguire's pendent claim, and, as a result, it
was an abuse of discretion for it to do so.
O'ConnorHospital v. Superior Court of California, 195 Cal. App. 3d
546, 240 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1987), rev. denied
and ordered not to be officially published (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23,
1987), cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. No. 87-1545 Mar. 17,
1988).
A California appeals court granted summary judgment to a
Catholic hospital in a wrongful termination suit brought against it by
a discharged chaplain. Paul E. Cleu brought suit charging that the
hospital had breached its employment agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Notwithstanding an employment
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agreement to the contrary, Cleu claimed that he was terminated without advance warning and despite satisfactory performance.
As an affirmative defense, the hospital argued that the termination decision was based on religious faith and thus shielded from judicial review by the first amendment. A trial court, granting partial
summary judgment, found that the hospital was sponsored and operated by a religious order and that Cleu was fulfilling an ecclesiastical
role as chaplain. However, citing disputed factual issues, the trial
court refused to grant summary judgment on the questions of whether
the priest had been discharged by the decision of a religious tribunal
and whether the hospital was an extension of a church.
The California Court of Appeals for the Sixth District concluded
that permitting Cleu to sue for wrongful discharge would impermissibly burden the hospital's free exercise of religion. The court characterized Cleu as a priest "garbed with church authority in a position to
influence the minds of the faithful, and in a sense, the church's representative clothed with its imprimatur." Thus, the court found that
judicial evaluation of the decision to discharge him would impermissibly interfere with church autonomy. Moreover, it concluded that
even the inquiry into the reasons for Cleu's discharge would be an
intrusion into the church's sphere of exclusive control.
Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources v. Rogue
Valley Youth for Christ, 87 Or. App. 573, 743 P.2d 745 (Oct. 7,
1987).
An Oregon appeals court has affirmed a decision by a referee
from the State Department of Human Resources that Rogue Valley
Youth for Christ (YFC) was a "church" within the meaning of Or.
Rev. Stat. § 657.072(l)(a) (1982), and therefore exempt from paying
unemployment compensation taxes. The dispute arose after the Employment Division of the Department of Human Resources assessed
taxes against YFC. YFC requested a hearing at which time the referee concluded that it was a church under § 657.072(1)(a). The section
exempts church employees from the obligation to pay unemployment
compensation taxes. The Employment Division appealed claiming
that the exemption was unconstitutional because it distinguished between churches and religious organizations which are not churches.
The appeals court rejected the Employment Division's argument.
It observed that the Division was challenging the constitutionality of
granting an exemption to a church employer while denying such ex-
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emptions to nonchurch religious employers. The court held that the
issue was not properly before it since no party to the case was a religious organization that had been denied an exemption on the basis
that it was not a church.
II. TAXES & TAX REGULATIONS
Shiloh Youth Revival Centers v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 565 (Mar.
12, 1987).
The United States Tax Court has ruled that income from a tax
exempt religious organization's "donated labor" was taxable as unrelated income. The ruling was made with regard to Shiloh Youth Revival Centers, an organization that operated several centers
throughout the United States where members live in communal settings governed by fundamentalist Christian beliefs. The organization
attracted many young street people who were given meals and shelter.
Shiloh provides food, housing, medical care, and a religious educational program for its members. In exchange, residents worked in
unskilled jobs outside the organization for which Shiloh received payment, or residents performed without pay services necessary for the
operation of Shiloh such as full-time house work, kitchen help, vehicle
drivers, errand people, and laundry workers. Religion was stressed in
all aspects of the organization's work. Workers in outside jobs such
as forestry, painting, housecleaning, and maintenance, also prayed,
sang, and participated in Bible study during work and breaks.
After learning that the organization might be liable for unrelated
business income tax under I.R.C. § 511 and 512(a)(1), in 1977 Shiloh
adopted a work philosophy which described the organization's understanding of the place that work occupied in its religious mission.
Although its activities were regularly carried on as a trade or business, the organization claimed that the activities did not fall under
statutory definitions of unrelated business income.
The Tax Court disagreed. Citing United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986), the court found that Shiloh
had failed to establish a causal relationship between the conduct of
the organization's business activities and the achievement of its exempt purpose. The court found that Shiloh as in American College of
Physicians, "the exempt functions of its activities were incidental to
raising revenue. "
The court found that the organization had failed to demonstrate
that the beliefs expressed in its work philosophy, which purportedly
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evidenced the place of supervised group labor in achieving Shiloh's
goals, were applied in practice. Financial survival and not group labor was the primary concern of the organization. Likewise, the court
found that while organization members participating in its business
had opportunities for religious activity, Shiloh had failed to show that
the conduct of its business was substantially related to the purposes of
religious training, worship, and evangelism. Even though Shiloh integrated religious activity into its business operations, the court found
that it was required to show that "its activities were peculiarly suited
to the accomplishment of its objectives."
Finally, the court rejected Shiloh's claim that it qualified under
the exception to the definition of "unrelated trade or business" found
in I.R.C. § 513(a)(1), which provides an exception for work carried
out without compensation. The court ruled that Shiloh workers were
compensated in both monetary and nonmonetary benefits. It concluded that: 1) members of the organization worked in business in
exchange for the benefits; 2) that a willingness to work was a requirement to retain membership; and 3) that the nature of the organization
indicated that it could not survive unless all of its members worked.
III.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Board of Education of Monroe- Woodbury Central School District v.
Wieder, 134 Misc. 2d 658, 512 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Feb. 10, 1987),
modified, 132 A.D.2d 409, 522 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Dec. 28, 1987),
motion denied, 523 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 19, 1987).
A New York appellate court has ruled that public school officials
may not offer remedial therapeutic or instructional services to nonpublic school students at a site near their school.
The Monroe-Woodbury Central School District brought suit
seeking a declaratory judgment that it could not provide special education and related services to students of the United Talmudic Academy (UTA) unless students were taught in regular public school
classes. UTA serves members of the Satmar Hasidic sect. The school
district had earlier provided such services in mobile units located near
UTA. Parents of UTA students responded to the suit by seeking a
court injunction directing the school board to restore the services previously provided. The school board cross-moved for summary judg-

ment and requested a declaratory judgment that it was prohibited
from providing services to handicapped, private school children other
than in regular public school classrooms.
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The Satmar Hasidic sect has religious tenets requiring that educational instruction be given in classes segregated by sex. Moreover,
UTS utilizes an education curriculum consistent with these tenets
designed to prevent acculturation of Jewish students.
The trial court found that N.Y. Educ. Law § 3602-C(9) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1983), providing that nonpublic school students
shall "receive such services in regular classes of the public school and
shall not be provided such services separately from pupils regularly
attending the public school," was not to be literally interpreted. The
court determined that § 3602-C(9) was intended to prevent the isolation of handicapped children and to provide them with as "normal
and equal learning educational environment and experience with children without handicapping conditions as the circumstances and ability of the handicapped child will permit." It stressed that it was not
the intent of the legislature to abolish, restrict, or withhold educational and therapeutic services to handicapped children. Therefore, it
determined that the law permitted, if not required, that such services
be provided at "other than the public school as long as it is not physically or educationally identified with the parochial non-public school
and its religious education."
However, the appeals court ruled that the appropriate interpretation of § 3602-c(9) was that the individualized educational needs of
nonpublic school children be provided in public school programs with
public school children. Moreover, it ruled that providing special educational services in classroom segregated by sex would violate the establishment clause by violating the secular effect and excessive
entanglement prongs of the Lemon test.
IV.

PRIVATE SCHOOLS & UNIVERSITIES

Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. Mar.
27, 1987), on remand, 670 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 28, 1988).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a district court
order denying the first amendment challenges of two fundamentalist
Baptist church schools to various aspects of Iowa's compulsory school
attendance laws. It also rejected the schools' claim that the state's
failure to permit them to utilize the "Amish exemption" violated the
equal protection clause.
The case was brought by two church schools, the churches' pastors and principals, and several of the schools' teachers, parents, and
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students. The schools challenged Iowa Code § 299.3 (1985), which
requires principals to file annual reports with local school districts
listing pupils' names, ages, dates of attendance, the texts used, and the
names of the teachers. Moreover, Iowa's compulsory attendance law
requires that parents of children 6 through 16 years of age enroll their
children in a public school or a school offering equivalent instruction
by a certified teacher until the completion of the eighth grade.
A federal district court had found that the reporting requirements of § 299.3 did not impinge on the schools' constitutional rights.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that any intrusion under § 299.3
was extremely limited. It commented that the reporting procedure
could be completed in less than one working day and did not interfere
with the content, approach, or structure of the plaintiffs' schools.
The plaintiffs' argued that requiring them to submit the form violated their belief in the headship of Christ and the separation of
church and state. The court noted that the Supreme Court had recognized a state's interest in the education of children as compelling. The
Iowa Supreme Court had made a similar finding in Johnson v. Charles
City Community Schools Board of Education, 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa),
cert. denied sub. nom. Pruesserv. Benton, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985). The
plaintiffs conceded the state's compelling interest in education, but
argued that the state's interest could be accomplished by allowing the
parents, rather than the schools, to supply the necessary information.
However, the court found that the minimal burden on the plaintiffs'
religious beliefs was clearly outweighed by the state's interest in receiving accurate information with regards to the children's education.
Further, it found that the plaintiffs' proposed alternative would not
adequately serve the state's interest, since under the scheme there
would be no means for verification of the information and no assurance that all parents would agree to such procedures. Likewise, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' free exercise clause challenge to the
teacher certification requirements. The plaintiffs had contended that
the certification requirement interfered with "a teacher's calling by
God to teach." They also objected to the Iowa Professional Teaching
Practices Commission's supervision of certified teachers and the requirement that a teacher complete a human relations course in order
to obtain or maintain certification. While the court recognized the
sincerity of the plaintiffs' beliefs and the burden they perceived by the
certification requirement, it found that their position was not altogether consistent. It noted that while they believed that licensure interfered with a teacher's calling by God to teach, they did not apply
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the same logic to the licensure of church members called by God to
other occupations such as law or medicine.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to analogize their situation to the Amish in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), finding that the burden imposed by the certification requirement was not nearly as great as the burden placed on the Amish
plaintiffs. The court in Yoder dealt with a situation in which the
Amish believed that sending their children to high school could endanger their own salvation and that of their children. Moreover, it
stressed that the certification process did not prevent teachers from
teaching from a biblical perspective nor prevent the schools from hiring only those teachers who met their religious criteria.
The court further concluded that the parents' suggestion that
achievement tests could serve as a less restrictive alternative to ensuring the state's interest in ensuring quality education was unconvincing. The court stated "tests primarily determine knowledge of
content of the subject matter. They do not test other aspects of education necessary to prepare a student for life in today's society." It
noted that a certified teacher received training in child development
and instruction methods. It also observed that such teachers were
mandatory child abuse reporters and had taken courses identifying
children with special needs. Therefore, it concluded that the certification requirement was the best means available to satisfy the state's
interest in the education and protection of its children and that it did
not violate the plaintiffs' free exercise rights.
Similarly, the court found that no excessive entanglement resulted from subjecting certified teachers in religious schools to the jurisdiction of the Professional Teaching Practices Commission. The
court noted that the statute and testimony indicated that the commission did not in any way interfere with private school teachers' religious beliefs or teachings.
The plaintiffs also objected to the requirement that the children
in private schools receive equivalent instruction to that offered in public schools on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague. The circuit court noted that Iowa had recently promulgated regulations
defining the term, and remanded that portion of the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of the new regulations. On remand, the district court found that the new standards provide
sufficient notice to private schools of how to comply with the minimum regulations. Thus, the district court held that the statute was no
longer unconstitutionally vague.
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The circuit court found that no equal protection clause violation
occurred by prohibiting the parents from taking advantage of the
"Amish exemption," Iowa Code § 299.24 (1985). The section exempts members of local congregations of recognized churches or religious denominations that profess "principles or tenets that differ
substantially from the objectives, goals and philosophy of education"
embodied in compulsory education statute. Since the plaintiffs sought
only to teach certain subjects in their own fashion, the court concluded that there was no substantial dissimilarity between their goals
and those embodied in the statute. Further, the court commented
that by creating the "Amish exemption" to compulsory school laws,
Iowa had tread "the fine line between the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause noted by the Supreme Court in Yoder."
New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow,
666 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. July 27, 1987).
New Life Baptist Church, its minister, and several members
whose children were enrolled in the New Life Academy, a private
school run by the church, brought suit in federal court requesting exemption from Massachusetts General Laws ch. 76, § 1 (1982), that
requires students to attend schools approved by a local school
committee.
The plaintiffs are fundamentalist Christians who believe that,
since God is the ultimate sovereign of their church, to submit its educational ministry for approval by the state would be a sin and would
expose their educational ministry to state control inconsistent with
their religious beliefs. The plaintiffs voluntarily provided to the local
school committee all information it required in the approval process,
including information about the school's philosophy and objectives,
curriculum, staff, record keeping, and financial support. The approval process required that: 1) the school request approval; 2) teachers have college degrees; 3) subjects required by Massachusetts law be
taught and educational materials reviewed by public school officials;
4) information be given regarding hours, curriculum, pupils' identity
and teachers' qualifications, compliance with discrimination laws, and
building standards; and 6) a two years reapproval review.
The plaintiffs commenced this action after it became evident that
the public school committee would continue to require that the school
go through the formal approval process. The church objected not
only to state approval but also to the state surveillance that approval
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entails and the unlikelihood of approval unless it employed more
highly educated teachers.
Emphasizing that the burden of proof was on the state, the district court ruled that the approval process was not the least restrictive
means of achieving the state's compelling interest in assuring that
children are adequately educated. Therefore, the state impermissibly
burdened the free exercise rights of the church and the parents. Furthermore, the approval process would violate the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test. The court found that standardized
testing, appropriate individual follow-up, and/or a requirement of appropriate academic credentials for teachers, were less burdensome
means of satisfying the state interest in adequate education.
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v.
Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1 (Nov. 20, 1987).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has ruled that Georgetown University could not discriminate against two homosexual
student groups in making available its facilities and services. The dispute arose when Georgetown refused to grant recognition to two gay
rights groups. The groups already had received student body endorsement and were thus entitled to use certain university facilities
and to apply for lecture fund privileges. However, university recognition would have entitled them to a mailbox, access to label and mailing services, and the right to apply for additional funding.
The student groups filed suit claiming that the university's refusal to grant them recognition violated the District of Columbia's
Human Rights Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2520 (1981). The act prohibits educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of sexual preference in permitting access to services and facilities.
The university initially claimed that it had not discriminated
against the groups on the basis of sexual orientation, but because of
the purposes and activities of the organizations. Further, Georgetown
claimed that even if its actions violated the act, requiring it to grant
recognition to the groups would violate its free exercise of religion.
The school argued that university recognition carried with it a "religiously guided endorsement' of the student groups which it could not
be officially compelled to grant under the first amendment." A trial
court found that the first amendment provided a defense for the university's violation of the act.
The Court of Appeals found that university recognition encom-
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passed two distinct elements: (1) endorsement, and (2) tangible benefits which flowed from recognition. With respect to the first element,
the court upheld the trial court's determination that university recognition carried with it endorsement of the recognized group. However,
it found that the statute did not require the school to endorse a group
in contravention to its religious principles. The court reasoned that
the statute was designed to insure equality in treatment. Moreover, it
noted that both the free exercise and free speech clauses of the constitution absolutely precluded government from forcing a private actor
to embrace a philosophy it found repugnant.
As to the second element, the court concluded that the statute
did require that Georgetown not discriminate in providing tangible
benefits such as access to its facilities and services. The court rejected
Georgetown's assertion that its denial of recognition was based on the
purposes and activities of the groups rather than their homosexual
orientation. Finally, it ruled that the District's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination outweighed any burden imposed on Georgetown's religious beliefs.
V.

HOME SCHOOLING

Leeper v. Arlington Independent School District, No. 17-88761-85

(Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 1987).
A texas court has granted a permanent injunction against certain
Texas public school districts prohibiting the prosecution of parents
who wished to educate their children at home.
The plaintiffs educated their children in their home because of
the religious convictions that home was the proper place to educate
children. The public school districts initiated prosecution of the parents believing they were in violation of the Texas compulsory attendance law. The districts' position was that home education did not
satisfy the statutory exemption of being a "private or parochial
school."

The guidelines passed by the Texas State Board of Education,
which interpreted Texas Education Code Ann. § 21.033. (Vernon
1972), were to be used to determine whether an entity was a private or
parochial school for purposes of the exemption. Based on the guidelines, the Texas Education agency changed its interpretation of what
it considered to be a private school. The prosecutions of the parents
ensued.
The court held that there was nothing in the state constitution or
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statutes that authorized the State Board of Education to promulgate
the guidelines in question. In 1915, when the Texas Legislature
passed the first compulsory attendance law (a part of which is now
§ 21.033(a)(1)), a home schooled child was considered to be in a private school. The Texas Legislature did not define "private or parochial school" in the education code. The court stated that the Texas
Legislature has not given the Texas Education Agency or the State
Board of Education any authority to define "private or parochial
school," because such entities have authority only over public schools.
The court found homeschools to be private schools within the
literal and historical meaning of § 21.033(a)(1). The court determined that the conduct of the Texas Education Agency towards these
parents amounted to arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable conduct,
and violated individual rights protected by the due process clause of
the United States and Texas Constitutions.
Ohio v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 56
U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. No. 87-62 Nov. 9, 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has declined to review an Ohio
Supreme Court decision rejecting objections to a statute requiring parents to seek approval of their home school instruction plans. The
challenge was made by two parents who were convicted of violating
the statute. They argued that the approval requirement burdened
their free exercise of religion. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions. It found that requiring parents to seek such approval
was a reasonable means of furthering the state's interest in education
which did not interfere with free exercise rights.
For a similar result, see Blount v. Maine, No. CV-86-494. (Maine
Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 1987) (rejecting parents challenge to state's home
school application requirement).
VI.

TORT CLAIMS

In re The Bible Speaks, 73 Bankr. 848 (D. Mass. May 19, 1987),
aff'd, 74 Bankr. 511 (D. Mass), appealfiled (1st Cir.
1988).
A federal bankruptcy court has ruled that Elizabeth Dayton
Dovydenas is entitled to recover over $6,500,000 from The Bible
Speaks Church. The court ruled that certain donations were the result of undue influence exerted upon Dovydenas by the church's pastor. The church has approximately 1200 members, operates several
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ministries, and conducts daily radio broadcasts. Dovydenas, heiress
of Dayton Department Stores founders, filed suit to recover the funds
after leaving the church. The church then sought protection from the
bankruptcy court.
Dovydenas and her husband, Jonas, began attending the church
in 1982. Shortly thereafter they were visited by the church's minister,
Carl H. Stevens. In mid-1983, Dovydenas informed Stevens that she
was "a born again Christian." Stevens instructed her to pray for Jonas who was "in the kingdom of darkness because he was not yet born
again' through the church." The court concluded that the statement
caused Dovydenas to view her husband as one controlled by the devil
initiating a period of growing estrangement between the couple.
Dovydenas became increasingly involved with the church and participated in numerous private counseling sessions and daily Bible classes.
She also began to reveal the extent of her wealth and many other
personal matters to Stevens. He instructed her that she only needed
$1 million to live on and that the rest should be given to the church.
Moreover, Stevens told Dovydenas she should not be influenced by
family members or advisors because they were not born again' and
were therefore controlled by the devil.
The money in dispute was given in separate gifts. The first
amount was $1 million given in November 1984. In May 1985 Dayton-Hudson stock valued at $5,000,325.00 was transferred to the
church. In December 1985 Dovydenas' family employed "exit counselors" who were instrumental in convincing her to leave the church.
The court found that the church exercised undue influence over
Dovydenas. It noted that Massachusetts' law required a party seeking to void a gift on a claim of undue influence to demonstrate that:
"(1) the donor was susceptible' to undue influence to the advantage of
the donee; (2) the donee deceived the donor or exerted an improper
influence over the donor; and (3) the donor submitted to the overmastering effect' of the donee's undue influence." Further, it stated that
undue influence was based on a finding that in light of all the facts, a
donee had exercised unfair persuasion' over (1) a donor whom he
dominated, or (2) a donor who justifiably assumed that the beneficiary
would not act in a manner inconsistent with her welfare.
The court found that the gifts to the church were the product of
undue influence. It reasoned that Stevens exercised undue influence
over Dovydenas through the "various unfair and improper means
which he used in gaining ascendancy over her." It found that while
Stevens' relationship of trust and confidence with her created no pre-
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sumption of undue influence, it did facilitate his ability to unduly influence her. And it found that he had abused that relationship.
The court rejected the church's claim that the first amendment
precluded judicial review because the case could not be adjudicated
without inquiry into doctrinal issues. It found that there was no first
amendment bar to resolution of the issues because Stevens' statements
were insincere and inconsistent with the church's beliefs, and because
there was a compelling policy supporting this type of claim.
The court noted Dovydenas had not alleged that she was defrauded by false religious beliefs or practices of the church, or that she
was unfairly manipulated into adopting the church's religious beliefs
or practices. The court observed that her claims "had nothing to do
with the validity or reasonableness of the church's beliefs or practices." Rather, it noted that the church never claimed, and in fact
strongly denied that the statements were reflective of its beliefs.
The court also concluded that the resolution of the case did not
turn on the truth, reasonableness or sincerity of the church's doctrine.
It stressed that Dovydenas was not a "dissident or apostate contesting
Church doctrine." Although the court noted that Stevens' statements
were religiously motivated, it stated that such was the case in all undue influence cases against church or clergy. It was the exploitation
of her religious motivations through unfair means which constituted
the elements of her cause of action.
In addition, the court found that the interests Dovydenas sought
to protect were sufficiently compelling to justify any burden on the
church's first amendment rights. It noted that a cause of action for
undue influence was "grounded upon important policy considerations
favoring the distribution of property in accordance with the free exercise of the human will ......
Stock v. Presnell, WL-14434, slip op. 4127 (Ohio Ct. App. July 15,
1987).
An Ohio appeals court has affirmed the dismissal of a complaint
against James Presnell and Shepherd of the Ridge Lutheran Church
for clergy malpractice, breach of fiduciary responsibility, and fraud
and misrepresentation. However, it reversed the dismissal of the
plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
case was brought by Richard L. Strock claiming that Presnell, a pastor with the Shepherd of the Ridge Lutheran Church, had engaged in
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sexual relations with Strock's former wife when the couple sought
marriage counseling from the church.
The trial court ruled that Ohio did not recognize a cause of action for clergy malpractice and that the first amendment barred such
a claim. It also found the remaining allegations in Strock's complaint
barred by Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 2305.29 (Anderson 1982), a statute
abolishing amatory actions. Strock challenged the trial court's dismissal of the clergy malpractice claim, asserting that a cleric and his
church did not have an absolute license to "do as they choose in regard to their right to counsel." Further, he charged that they had
breached their duty of care by exceeding acceptable counseling standards and failing to provide adequate training and supervision to
Presnell. Strock also charged that the trial court erred in granting the
motion to dismiss his claim for breach of fiduciary responsibility fraud
and misrepresentation.
Each of the three appeals court judges prepared a separate opinion reflecting varied reasoning. Two judges, Mahoney and George,
affirmed the dismissal of the clergy malpractice claim, with Judge
Cacioppo dissenting. Judge Mahoney found the clergy malpractice
claim unwarranted because the facts alleged did not support such a
cause of action. However, he refused to rule out the possibility that a
set of facts could be presented which would support such a cause of
action. He also found that Strock's allegations of breach of fiduciary
duty and misrepresentation were inextricably linked to his clergy malpractice claim.
Judge Mahoney ruled that the trial court erred in finding that
Strock's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
barred by the statute abolishing amatory actions. He commented that
the outrageous conduct allegedly involved was "the betrayal of the
trust which Strock placed in his minister, both as spiritual leader and
pastoral counselor," and that betrayal purportedly damaged Strock's
belief system and destroyed his trust in basic institutions thus causing
him great emotional trauma.
Judge George concurred in the dismissal of the clergy malpractice claim. However, he dissented with respect to the reversal of the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Judge George found
that adjudication of Strock's claims with respect to pastoral counseling would involve the court in an examination of the "truth or error
of the church's purpose in providing the counseling given a forbidden
judicial inquiry." Further, he stated that the first amendment pro-
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tected against such intrusions into religion and its ecclesiastical and
spiritual issues.
Judge George also noted that pastoral marriage counseling was
not licensed within the state, and there were no published or generally
accepted standards for such counseling. Thus, it would be necessary
to set a reasonable minister standard. Such an inquiry would necessitate a review of the training and education required for ministers.
Judge George would have affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding that
Strock's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was an
attempt to recover for amatory injuries. While he cautioned that the
statutory abolition of amatory actions did not mean that amatory conduct could never state a cause of action in intentional infliction of
emotional distress, he found that Presnell's conduct here was not sufficiently outrageous to meet the standard of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Further, he found that a cause of action could not
be imposed upon Presnell simply because he was a minister.
Judge Cacioppo concurred with Judge Mahoney's disposition of
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. However, he dissented with regard to the clergy malpractice claim. He characterized
the issue as whether "the first amendment's free exercise clause bars a
negligence cause of action against a church and its minister under the
allegations set forth in Strock's complaint."
Judge Cacioppo stated that the conduct upon which liability was
based was not arguably religious. Citing critical commentary of the
cases upon which the trial court relied, he found that rather than impeding religious liberty, permitting malpractice claims against pastoral counselors "reinforces the church's own religious doctrine." He
stated that the imposition of societal prohibitions on such conduct
through the civil law enhanced, rather than restricted, religious liberty. In addition, he reasoned that the first amendment had no application here due to the evolving nature of pastoral counseling. Judge
Cacioppo commented that although such counseling was once dictated solely by religious principles, it was currently "greatly influenced by modern psychological science." He stated that "the fact
that counseling is not a purely sacrodotal function of the clergy-but
one that overlaps that of the sociologist, psychologist, and psychiatrist-makes the creation of minimal standards not only necessary,
but facile." Moreover, he found that analogizing a cleric's counseling
function to that of a psychologist provided a ready set of standards.
Specifically, Judge Cacioppo noted the prohibition of sexual conduct
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between psychologists and patients contained in Ohio Admin. Code
§ 4732-17-O(A)(2)(d) (1982). He also noted that there was a possibility that Presnell was a licensed marriage counselor, and, if so,
would in fact be subject to the standard.
Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, 819 F.2d
875 (9th Cir. June 10, 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a district court
ruling that Janice Paul was prohibited from recovering damages based
on the "shunning" she was subjected to by the Jehovah's Witnesses.
The court ruled that tort recovery was barred because the church's
shunning was protected under the free exercise clause. Paul, who disassociated herself from the church, brought suit charging defamation,
invasion of privacy, fraud, and outrageous conduct after the church
instructed its adherents to shun her. Paul left the Jehovah's Witnesses after her parents were disfellowshipped as a result of internal
discord within their congregation. At the time of her withdrawal, the
church subjected only those members who had been disfellowshipped
from the church to the social ostracism known as shunning. In 1981
the church issued a revised interpretation of the rules governing disassociated persons. The revision subjected both the disassociated and
disfellowshipped persons to shunning.
Affirming the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the essence of Paul's claim was that the practice of shunning invaded interests which the state should protect through its tort law. The court
initially noted that the actions at issue in the case were clearly taken
pursuant to church policy. Moreover, it commented that while shunning was an intentional act, it was not malum in se. Thus it reasoned
that the state was concerned with regulating the practice only to the
extent that individuals were directly harmed. After reviewing the nature of emotional distress claims permissible under Washington tort
law, the court found it necessary to determine whether Paul had set
forth a prima facie claim. Even if shunning were tortious conduct,
said the court, it would be privileged under the free exercise clause.
The court decided that application of tort law to the activities of
a church or its members in furtherance of their religious belief was an
exercise of state power. The court found that permitting tort recovery, although not criminalizing shunning, would make the practice an
"unlawful act" and would have the same effect as prohibiting the
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practice. Thus, a church would be compelled to abandon the practice
or risk substantial damages anytime it shunned a former member.
The court ruled that state intervention was not justified under the
decisions in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 309 U.S. 626 (1940), and Sherbert v. Verner, 371 U.S. 938 (1962). The practice of shunning was not
sufficient to constitute a threat to the peace, safety or morality of the
community. It ruled that the harm Paul suffered as a result of the
shunning was not the type of injury which could justify imposition of
tort liability for religious conduct. The court stressed that the offense
to someone's sensibilities resulting from religious conduct is simply
not actionable in tort. Without society's tolerance of offenses to sensibility, the protection of religious differences mandated by the first
amendment would be meaningless.
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1987).
The Missouri Court of Appeals has overturned a trial court's dismissal of a suit brought by Harold and Hazel Hester against the Rev.
Donald Barnett with regard to claims of alienation of affections, defamation of character, invasion of privacy, and interference with contract. However, the court upheld the dismissal of counts alleging
ministerial malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The dispute arose after Barnett, an ordained Baptist minister,
visited the Hester home. He invited the Hesters to confide in him
with the assurance that their communications would be held in strict
confidence. The Hesters alleged that despite those assurances Barnett
divulged to church deacons and members of the community the information regarding their children's behavioral problems. They also asserted that he falsely accused them publicly of child abuse and
instructed their children to lie about the nature of parental discipline.
Additionally, the Hesters claimed that Barnett began a series of public
accusations against them, charging they were irreligious and abusive
parents. They further argued that he alienated the children's affection
from them and attempted to alienate affections between husband and
wife. Finally, they alleged that Barnett had harassed, intimidated,
threatened, and caused employees of their family business to leave
their employment.
The court first addressed the ministerial malpractice claim, noting that the tort was unknown in Missouri law. The concept of professional malpractice was premised on "the breach of a professional
duty unique to that profession." Stressing that malpractice was not a
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theory of ordinary negligence or of an intentional tort, it found that a
functional theory of clergy malpractice needed "to address incidents
of the clergy-communicant relationship not already actionable." The
court found that the clergymen's role as a spiritual counselor was that
closest "to an existent professional practice, and hence most accountable to minimum professional standards." Moreover, it characterized
the tort as premised on the presumption that every cleric owes the
same duty of care regardless of the particular beliefs of his religion.
Next, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the claim
against Barnett for alienation of affections. The complaint alleged
that the minister intentionally and maliciously attempted to alienate
the affections of the Hesters and their three children. Mrs. Hester
claimed that such conduct caused her to lose the "love, care, companionship, consortium and trust of her husband." The court found that
the claimants had sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for spousal
alienation of affections. Although Barnett had denied the allegations
without asserting that his conduct was privileged or protected by the
free exercise clause, the court commented that interference with a
marital relationship stemming from good faith pronouncement of
doctrine or advocacy of religious faith could not be actionable. However, it determined that the conduct pleaded here was not merely a
ministerial function, but rather was "malicious conduct--doctrine
apart-to separate the wife from the husband." However, it affirmed
the dismissal of the alienation of affection claims between the children
and the mother and stepfather.
The appeals court found the trial court erred in dismissing Hester's defamation claim. The Hester's contended that "Barnett had
wrongfully accused [them] of crimes, stealing, abuse, physical and
emotional cruelty to their [sic] spouse, her children and his step-children . . . ." The court rejected Barnett's contention that the count
was insufficient because it failed to allege time, place, or means of the
defamatory publications.
The court concluded that Barnett was entitled to only a limited
immunity from defamation liability for statements he contended were
privileged utterances published "in the performance of his duties as a
minister of the gospel and as a citizen." The court found that the
statutory provisions protecting individuals from liability who report
suspected child abuse, did not extend to one intentionally filing a false
report. Because the complaint alleged that Barnett's statements were
knowingly false, it was found sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
The court rejected Barnett's contention that the statements made
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in performance of his duties as a minister were absolutely privileged
under the first amendment. However, it reasoned that a free exercise
clause defense to defamation presented concerns not present in the
other claims. Relying on Cantwell v. Connecticut, 309 U.S. 626 (1940)
and Sherbert v. Verner, 371 U.S. 938 (1962), the court emphasized
that restrictions could be placed on religiously motivated conduct
which "posed a substantial threat to public safety peace or order."
Nonetheless, it recognized that consistent with United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), judicial inquiry could not be made into the
truth or falsity of religious belief. The court concluded that denying
individuals access to the courts to redress injuries to their reputation
caused by defamatory statements, could lead to a "sense of the unfairness and frustration in the persons injured [which] left unrequited
tends to fester into a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Therefore, it found that the courts must permit "the vindication of the right to reputation without constitutional infringementalbeit the words and conduct of defamation were uttered in a religious
setting." Even though courts could not inquire into the truth or falsity of statements of religious belief, they could review statements
made in a religious setting and asserted to be religious to determine if
they were made pursuant to such a belief or served to cloak a secular
purpose such as the intent to injure a reputation. The statements alleged here were not of a kind "inherently and invariably expressions
of religious belief or religious purpose" which would be absolutely
protected through the free exercise clause. Therefore, it concluded
that a judicial remedy would not burden free exercise rights.
The court stressed that it based its opinion on the assumption
that the Hesters were not members of Barnett's church. The court
reasoned that if the statements were a form of "chastening usual as to
wayward members and comfortable to the liturgy, discipline and ecclesiastical polity of the church," and the Hester's were members of
the congregation, they had presumably "consented to religiously-motivated discipline practiced in good faith." It cautioned that statements made in such a setting were privileged communications, and
the privilege was lost if the church acted with an intention to injure
the plaintiffs' reputation, feelings, or profession.
The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim finding that the complaint failed
to adequately allege the extreme and outrageous behavior that cause
of action required.
The Hester's invasion of privacy claim was found sufficient to the
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extent that it alleged unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. The allegation that Barnett gained access to the Hester's home
under the "pretense of a counselor to assist in correction of the children's behavior, when the true motive was to harm the Hester's by
disclosure of the information obtained through that guile" was found
sufficient to describe an improper interference with seclusion. However, the court concluded that the Hester's had failed to adequately
allege public disclosure of private facts or publicity unreasonably
placing another's private life in a false light.
Finally, the court found that the complaint had adequately
pleaded tortious interference with contract stemming from Barnett's
alleged enticement, harassment, intimidation, threatening, and causing of the Hester's employees to leave their employment at the Hester's farming business.
VII.

INTRACHURCH DISPUTES

Atterberry v. Smith, 104 Pa. Commw. 550, 522 A.2d 683 (Mar. 12,
1987).
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has vacated the order of a lower court insofar as it determined that the appointments
and removals of church officers were valid. The lower court decision
was affirmed to the extent that it determined that the denomination
was hierarchical and insofar as it enjoined certain church members
from engaging in disruptive behavior.
The case involved opposing factions of church trustees and had
its roots in a dispute within a local congregation of the House of God
Church occurring upon the death of the founder, Bishop A.H. Whyte.
Bishop Whyte had appointed his son, Raymond Whyte, to be his successor, but members of the Board of Bishops disputed Bishop Raymond Whyte's authority and elected Bishop J.A. Smith as the new
President General.
The present litigation arose from a dispute among various members of the Church of the Living God of York, Pennsylvania. The
plaintiffs alleged the Church of the Living God to be a constituent
local church of the House of God Church. The plaintiffs further alleged that the Church of the Living God was governed by the Church
Discipline, a document containing doctrinal statements and the denominational polity. The plaintiffs alleged that they were appointed
to various church offices by the Rev. Carl Whyte, who they asserted
was the pastor of the Church of the Living God. They further as-

JOURNAL OF LAW& RELIGION

[Vol. 6

serted that the defendants were removed from their offices by the Rev.
Carl Whyte. The plaintiffs maintained that the Rev. Carl Whyte's
appointment and authority was in accordance with the Church
Discipline.
Having lost in the trial court, on appeal, the defendants argued
that the Rev. Carl Whyte had no authority to act unilaterally to appoint or remove church officers, that the denomination was not hierarchical in nature, and that the local congregation was not bound by
the Church Discipline.
The appeals court examined whether the dispute was over doctrine or involved questions of civil law. The court noted the case of
Presbyteryof Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 507 Pa.
255, 489 A.2d 1317, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 198 (1985), where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that where the disputes involving principles of civil law, such as ownership of property, could
be resolved by employing neutral principles of law. However, where
the resolution of the issue involved questions of discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law, a civil court must defer to the highest
church judicatory. The appeals court determined that the dispute was
primarily doctrinal.
Next, the Commonwealth Court attempted to resolve the question of whether a civil court had jurisdiction to decide what body was
the highest judicatory to hear the substantive issues. The court affirmed the trial court's factual determination that the church was
hierarchial and stated that the lower court did not intrude into impermissible areas of church doctrine. Further, the appeals court decided
to remand the case to the trial court so that the lower court might
identify the highest church judicatory within the relevant church
body. The court reasoned that under Middlesex, it was the church
tribunal and not the trial court which must decide the substantive
questions at issue. The court vacated that part of the trial court's
order which held that the appointments and removals of church officers were valid.
Finally, although the matter was not pressed on appeal, the court
determined that the trial court was completely within its equity in
enjoining the defendants from disrupting or harassing other church
members.
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Elmora Hebrew Center v. Fishman, 215 N.J. Super. 589, 522 A.2d
497 (Mar. 13, 1987).
A New Jersey appellate court has denied injunctive relief to a
Jewish synagogue against its rabbi and other members of the congregation. The Elmora Hebrew Center filed a complaint in the Chancery
Division against the rabbi alleging various grounds for his discharge.
The trial court refused to grant the injunction. However, exercising
its equitable powers, it referred the matter to the Beth Din (an ecclesiastical tribunal of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis) to resolve the religious dispute between the rabbi and the congregation. Pending
completion of the Beth Din process, the trial court retained jurisdiction over any contract and civil issues.
The synagogue appealed, arguing that it was a nonorthodox congregation that was wholly independent of other Jewish synagogues
and groups. Because it was not responsible to any higher ecclesiastical authority, it argued that the dispute should be resolved by reference to modem principles of contract and corporate law. Further, the
synagogue claimed that because it was not part of a hierarchical structure, there were no religious questions at issue which would preclude
civil court adjudication. The defendants contended that the "Code of
Jewish Law" governed questions regarding a rabbi's terms of office
and tenure, and that such questions were the exclusive province of the
ecclesiastical courts.
The court found that it was inappropriate for it to resolve the
defendant's contention that the Code of Jewish law was applicable to
all Jewish congregations and that the status and duties of a rabbi were
to be determined in accordance with Jewish and rabbinical law. Relying on Zimbler v. Felber, 111 Misc. 2d 867, 445 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1981),
the court found that it was not appropriate for it to determine
whether the assertion that a rabbi was not required to relinquish his
position even on expiration of his contract, unless removed by a qualified Beth Din, applied to all Jewish congregations or not to nonorthodox congregations. In the present case, it noted that the
factual issues included questions concerning the identity of the duly
constituted board of trustees and officers of the congregation, whether
the congregation was orthodox or nonorthodox, and the status and
jurisdiction of the Beth Din. It found that those questions could not
be resolved without determining questions of a religious nature which
would necessitate an inquiry into religious tenets and polity. Thus, it
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stated that those issues would have to be resolved before a civil court
could resolve any of the remaining issues of a purely civil nature.
Stressing that a religious dispute was inseparably intertwined in
the allegations of the complaint, the court found that the chancery
division's abstention from the religious aspects of the dispute was warranted. Therefore, it upheld the trial court's denial of injunctive relief. It affirmed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings in accordance with the trial court's order. It also
vacated the injunctive order prohibiting the rabbi from returning to
the synagogue's pulpit.
Hardwick v. First Baptist Church of Perth Amboy, 217 N.J. Super.
85, 524 A.2d 1298 (Apr. 24, 1987).
An appellate division of the Superior Court of New Jersey overturned a trial judge's order dismissing a case in which the plaintiffs
claimed that they were wrongfully expelled as members of First Baptist Church of Perth Amboy. The plaintiffs are 21 members of a Hispanic congregation listed on the membership rolls of the church.
In 1970 the church started a mission to the Hispanic community
of Perth Amboy. By April 1979 the Hispanic congregation had 21
members. The dispute arose after a special business meeting called in
June 1983 when the English-speaking members of the congregation
declared the Hispanic members to be "nonmembers" and subsequently gave the Hispanic congregation a 30-day notice of eviction.
The church claimed that the purported members of the Hispanic
congregation had been inappropriately entered on membership rolls.
Specifically, they claimed that the former pastor had directed the
church's clerk to enter individuals as members without complying
with bylaw provisions requiring that membership be approved by the
deacons and the existing members of the church. While the bylaws
did make such a provision, the Hispanic members claimed that provision was not utilized and had not been applied to any English-speaking members of the church. Moreover, the church claimed that the
Hispanic congregation formed a separate church and that the 21
members of the Hispanic congregation were deleted from the church's
rolls and transferred to the newly formed church. The Hispanic congregation, however, claimed that the attempt to form a new congregation never came to fruition and they had since been active members in
good standing of the church. The trial court dismissed the case on the
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basis that resolution of the matter turned on questions of religious
doctrine.
The appeals court reversed. Although religious institutions were
protected from civil interference, the court stressed that members of a
religious corporation are entitled to statutory protection under laws
governing such corporations. There was no impediment to a judicial
determination of whether an individual was a church member, but
only that civil courts could not properly determine on theological
grounds whether individuals were members. Thus, since the Baptist
church did not have a hierarchical structure, there was an apparent
impasse guiding the trial judge on how he should resolve any doctrinal aspect of the membership dispute.
The court suggested that the parties consider the selection of an
arbitration panel comprised of one Baptist minister or professor chosen by each side and a mutually acceptable third panel member who
would be chosen by those two. The court proposed that the panel
resolve such issues as whether deacons were doctrinally required to
pass on membership prior to a congregational vote, or whether a minister could alternatively admit a parishioner to membership.
However, should the arbitration efforts be unavailing, the court
determined that it would not accept the proposition that civil courts
lack jurisdiction to determine whether the established procedures of a
religious organization have been followed in expelling a member. It
noted the trial court's ruling that apart from cases involving religious
doctrine, there was no basis for treating religious organizations differently from other nonprofit, voluntary associations. Therefore, if the
parties are unable to resolve the problem, the court would be required
to determine the issues before it, including "religious issues as factual
matters established by lay testimony and expert proof concerning the
practices and doctrine of the congregation." The court remanded the
case to the Chancery Division for further proceedings in accordance
with the opinion.
VIII.

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. City of Long
Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 1987).
A federal district court has granted a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the City of Long Branch and a local Jewish congregation in an action brought by the American Civil Liberties Union to
prevent the creation of an eruv.
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An eruv, under Jewish law, is an unbroken boundary designation
of an area. The designation of an eruv allows observant Jews to carry
or push objects from place to place within the area during the Sabbath. Pushing and carrying are not permitted in the public domain on
the Sabbath. However, the creation of an eruv permits such actions
by creating the fiction of a "private domain."
The demarcation of the eruv boundary is primarily created using
existing telephone poles and fences. The city's resolution establishing
the eruv and authorizing the congregation to erect the poles and fence
extensions on public property is the focus of the ACLU's challenge.
The ACLU alleged that the creation of an eruv violates the establishment clause and Article 1, Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the New Jersey
Constitution.
In applying the Lemon test, the federal court found no violation
of either the state or federal constitutions. The court determined that
by permitting the synagogue to use its own funds to create an almost
invisible boundary, the City of Long Branch was not putting its imprimatur on any manifestation of religion. The court concluded that
providing equal access to public facilities to people of all religions,
thus enabling individuals to get to and from their chosen places of
worship safely, was a permissible accommodation by the government.
IX.

SPEECH/POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Bemis Pentecostal Church v. Tennessee, 731 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. May
26, 1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1102 (Mar. 7, 1988).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that churches purchasing radios, television and newspaper advertisements expressly opposing the adoption of a liquor-by-the-drink referendum were political
campaign committees subject to the provisions of the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-10-101, et seq. (1980).
The case arose out of a 1984 referendum to permit the sale of liquorby-the-drink in the City of Jackson. Thirteen churches engaged in
activities in opposition to the referendum, including the purchase of
radio, television, and newspaper advertisements. The court noted
that the churches expressed their opposition to the referendum in radio and television broadcasts of their regular religious services, in
church newsletters, and that at least one church contributed money to
a political campaign committee. Following an anonymous letter, the
State Attorney General issued an opinion that churches would be required to file disclosure statements under the act. In response, the
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churches filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that subjecting
them to the act's provisions would violate their consitutional rights.
At a trial held in Chancery Division, the chancellor issued a
memorandum opinion finding that the churches were subject to the
campaign disclosure law. That decision was reversed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals which held that the act burdened free speech
rights, and, absent a compelling state interest, was unconstitutional as
applied to referendum elections.
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed. The court reviewed the
centrality of the electoral process in a democracy and the state's manifest right to control that process. It found that the act was motivated
by such considerations, and that the legislature intended that the act
reach referendum elections. Further, the court found that there was
no significant dispute as to whether the act as written applied to the
churches. The court stated that apparently all the churches received
or made expenditures within the meaning of the statute, thus rendering them political campaign committees for the "narrow purposes of
the Act." However, the court noted that because none of the
churches appeared to have spent more than $1,000 on the August
referendum, they would be subject only to the minimal disclosure requirements. Further, it commented that the act merely required certification of a political treasurer, an address, periodic disclosure filings
and notarizations of verifications of signatures. The court found that
the requirements could be readily performed within the churches'
present organizational structures.
The court determined that the state's interest in protecting the
integrity and fairness of the political process was compelling. The
court noted that the provision imposed a graduated disclosure requirement dependent upon the degree of financial involvement in the
campaign and the nature of the office or activity. Further, the court
commented that the act did not apply to the financing of generalized
discussions of public issues, but was "triggered only when a group is
financing an election outcome specific advocacy in a particular campaign." It observed that the express advocacy provision of the statute
was consistent with the requirement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curium), where the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court had found that "narrowly constitutioned disclosure requirement[s] [are] generally within constitutional
bounds." The Tennessee court also reasoned that the Buckley Court

JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION

[Vol. 6

had found disclosure requirements to be the least restrictive means of
curbing campaign ignorance and corruption.
However, the court cautioned that the churches' radio and television broadcasts of their regular religious services and distribution of
newsletters could not be considered campaign expenditures or contributions, regardless of whether they advocated a particular election result or not. The court stated that such activities were entitled to first
amendment protection and expressly excluded from the operation of
the statute. Only the financing of direct participation in a campaign
through activities in which churches would not have otherwise been
engaged triggered the act. The court commented that such activities
as publishing advertisements warning of the potential or actual effect
of alcohol consumption or perceived social evils outside of the context
of an election campaign, or during a campaign without specific advocacy, would not fall within the act. However, it cautioned that such
activities could not be timed or intended to circumvent the requirements of the act.
Finally, the court reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), and
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981),
finding that the Supreme Court had "implicitly-if not explicitlycountenanced the constitutionality of simple disclosure requirements
such as those imposed by the Tennessee Act." The act did not control
the quality or content of speech, limit contributions or total expenditures, and was neutral in its application to groups and the types of
activities at which it was aimed. It found that the act served the compelling state interest of maintaining free, open and fair elections, providing for the dissemination of campaign information to voters,
preventing corruption and fraud, and assisting in record keeping to
permit effective enforcement of the act. It also found that the burdens
imposed by the act were minimal. Specifically, with regard to the
churches, the court stated that the record keeping burden imposed by
the statute was no greater than that imposed by other state and federal laws which involve church compliance.
Gregorie v. CentennialSchool District, 674 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 28, 1987).
A federal district court has determined that a Pennsylvania
school district's refusal to rent its auditorium to an evangelical Christian youth organization violated the first amendment. Student Ven-
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ture, a subsidiary of Campus Crusade for Christ, applied to rent the
auditorium of the William Tennent High School for a performance by
Andre Kole, a magician/illusionist, to be followed by a 15 minute
religious message. The school denied the application, citing a policy
prohibiting the use of school facilities for religious purposes. Student
Venture filed suit charging that the school had violated the free exercise, establishment, free speech, and assembly clauses of the first
amendment, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief to Student
Venture. By making its facilities generally available for rental by various groups, the school created a forum which "though definitionally
limited' [was] for all intents and purposes a public forum from the
vantage point of the protection of First Amendment rights of free
speech and association." The court found that the school's refusal to
rent its facilities to Student Venture constituted content-based discrimination which was not justified by a compelling state interest.
Specifically, the court rejected the school district's contention that its
actions were justified by the need to avoid violating the establishment
clause. Further, it found that permitting the rental would not have
the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, concluding that
use during nonschool hours, which was neither employee-initiated or
primarily attended by students, did not confer any state endorsement
of religion.
Clark v. Dallas Independent School District, 671 F. Supp. 1119
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 1987).
A federal district court has granted summary judgment to the
Dallas Independent School District in a case brought by members of a
student religious group. The plaintiffs challenged a school policy
which prohibited student groups from meeting on campus immediately before or after the school day for religious purposes. The meetings began during the 1982-83 school year as unscheduled, informal
prayer sessions occurring several times a week with six or seven students. No administrator interfered with the meetings. By the 198485 school year, about 60 students attended the meeting which were
scheduled on a regular basis. In addition, to advance the group's new
objective of seeking converts, it invited other students, distributed
religious pamphlets, and its leader preached loudly to attract new
members. Thereafter, school officials directed the group's leader to
refrain from preaching. The leader was warned to refrain from con-
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ducting religious meetings on school property. Notwithstanding the
warning, on four different occasions he used bullhorns to broadcast
religious messages to students from property adjacent to the schools.
School officials, however, did not attempt to prevent group members
from discussing their religion with others or praying discreetly.
The students filed suit claiming that the policy interfered with
their first amendment rights. The court ruled that the district's policy
was mandated by the establishment clause. It noted that students
could exercise first amendment rights in the public school limited by
the special considerations of that setting. In that respect, it found that
the use of bullhorns, student proselytizing, and large organized student religious meetings were activities inconsistent with the school environment. Therefore, it concluded that such activities could be
prohibited without violating the students' free exercise rights.
The court also concluded that a policy permitting on-campus
student religious meetings would violate the establishment clause. It
reasoned that "little violence" would be done to the plaintiffs' interests by a resolution in the district's favor, while an opposite result
"would operate against the district's constitutional obligations."
Finally, the court found that application of the Equal Access
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-73 (1982), would require a judgment in favor
of the students, and that such a result would violate the establishment
clause.
Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School District, 673 F. Supp. 1379
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1987).
A federal district court has ruled that school officials violated the
free speech rights of junior high school students by prohibiting them
from distributing copies of a religiously oriented newspaper in the
school building. Bryan Thompson, Marc Shunk, and Christopher Eakle brought suit against the Waynesboro Area School District after
school officials placed the students on in-school suspension for refusing to follow instructions prohibiting them from distributing copies of
their religious newspapers, Issues and Answers. Following initial distribution of the newspaper in the school hallway, the principal issued
an order which restricted the distribution to the school sidewalks and
parking lot prior to the beginning of the school day. He based his
order on a policy which required prior approval of material so that a
time and place of distribution could be established, and to ensure that
the material would not interfere with the school's educational process,
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students filed suit claiming violation of their free speech, free exercise
and equal protection rights, and the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 4071-4074 (1982).
Ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the court said
that the school's policy violated the students' free speech rights, but
not their rights under the Equal Access Act or the free exercise
clause.
Addressing first the Equal Access Act claim, the court found it
inapplicable. The court noted that the school permitted student-initiated noncurriculum related groups to meet twice a week during noninstructional time. However, it found that the activities at issue here
did not constitute a meeting within the meaning of the act.
The court also ruled that the students' free exercise of religion
rights were not violated by the restrictions. Although the students'
religious beliefs encompasses the right to share their beliefs with
others, it found that the school had not unduly burdened the exercise
of that right. It concluded that they were merely required to select
another area or method for exercising their religious beliefs.
However, the court reached a contrary result with respect to the
students' free speech claims. It concluded that the school had created
a limited open forum on its campus by permitting diverse studentinitiated groups to meet. Further, it found that the refusal to permit
any in-school distribution of the paper was a content-based restriction
which could only be justified by a compelling state interest. Relying
on the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), and the district court opinion in Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District, 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd., 741 F.2d
538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986), reh'g denied, 106
S. Ct. 2003 (1986), the court rejected the school's contention that its
actions served the compelling state interest of avoiding violation of
the establishment clause. It ruled that the school's purpose in maintaining a limited open forum was to promote the intellectual and social development of students, and that permitting the plaintiffs here to
gather on an equal basis with other groups for the purpose of distributing Issues & Answers would have a secular purpose.
The court found that permitting the distribution would not result
in an advancement of religion or excessive entanglement. However,
the court did conclude that the same content-neutral time, place and
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manner restrictions applicable to other student-activity clubs could be
placed on the distribution of the newspaper.
X.

MEDICAL ISSUES

In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Feb. 20, 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (U.S. No. 86-1853 Oct. 5, 1987).
The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that a woman suffering a
psychotic delusion that she is the wife of a faith-healer evangelist was
nevertheless entitled to refuse medical treatment for a malignant uterine cancer. The case arose when officials at the Ohio Psychiatric Hospital requested authorization to perform treatment for cancer on
Nancy Milton, a patient being voluntarily treated at the hospital.
Milton refused treatment because of her religious belief in faithhealing.
The court reviewed Ohio law applicable to mental hospital patients, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.271 (Anderson 1984), which permits mental hospital patients to give consent to surgical procedures if
the patient is capable of giving a fully informed, intelligent, and knowing consent. Moreover, the section provides that absent substantial
risk of physical harm to the patient or others, "compulsory medical,
psychological, or psychiatric treatment of any patient who is being
treated by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with a
recognized religious method of healing" is not authorized without
court action. However, the statute permits hospital officials to obtain
court approval for treatment when a patient is incapable of receiving
the necessary information to provide consent.
The hospital sought court approval for the cancer treatment contending that Milton's delusion that she is the spouse of a faith-healer
rendered her incapable of understanding or appreciating the information necessary to either consent to or refuse the treatment. However,
Dr. Eugene Green, a psychiatrist, testified that the patient was alert
and responsive, was of normal intelligence, and could function in
many areas of everyday life. Dr. Lewis Linder, the chief medical officer of the hospital, testified that Milton had never been adjudicated
incompetent, and that the hospital had not questioned her competency to provide informed consent to all prior treatments at the hospital, including the biopsy which revealed the tumor.
A trial court ruled that Milton had the mental capacity to understand the nature of her illness and proposed treatment, but because
she was not receiving current treatment from a faith-healer, the court
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could intervene. The appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that Milton's belief in faith healing "by all rational
evaluation, constitute[s] a delusion."
In finding that Milton's free exercise rights should prevail, the
Ohio Supreme Court stressed that she had not been adjudicated incompetent, but rather was voluntarily hospitalized. It noted that persons in mental hospitals retained all civil rights not specifically denied
by statute or removed through an adjudication of incompetency. It
stated that those rights included the freedom to practice one's religious beliefs and to refuse medical treatment for religious reasons.
Addressing the specific facts, the court found that Milton's delusion that she is a faith-healer's wife and that he would "heal her infirmities" did not negate her constitutional right to freely adhere to her
religious beliefs. It noted Dr. Green's testimony that her psychosis
was primarily limited "to delusional imaginations" and that "certain
other parts of her seem pretty much intact." It observed that Dr.
Green had testified that she was aware of her malignancy, but believed that it would be cured through faith healing. It also noted that
she believed herself to be a faith-healer, had a long-standing belief in
spiritual healing, and did not believe in other methods of treatment.
It rejected the lower court's determination that Milton's delusional
belief negated her religious views and rendered her entire belief system delusional, finding that the ruling disregarded her long-standing
belief in faith healing. Noting the existence of a dichotomy between
medicine and religion, it stated that when the dictates of the two collided, the conflict was to be resolved by leaving medical treatment
decisions to the individual.
The court also rejected the hospital's contention that because
Milton was not a member of a specific religious denomination or sect,
and was not being treated in accordance with a recognized method of
spiritual healing, her beliefs were not entitled to protection. The
court found such a contention to conflict with the constitutional precept that all religious beliefs were entitled to equality before the law.
Ohio v. Miller, Nos. 86-CRM-30, 31 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas. Apr.
27, 1987).
An Ohio Court of Common Pleas has ruled that Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2919.22 (Anderson 1984), exempting parents who treat their
child's physical or mental illness through prayer in accordance with
the tenets of a recognized religious body, was unconstitutional. The
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ruling came in the criminal prosecution of Diane and Steven Miller
who were charged with child endangerment after their two-year old
daughter died of pneumonia. The Millers, consistent with their belief,
treated their daughter by prayer and refused to seek medical assistance. The court noted that the parents' beliefs were in accordance
with the tenets of a recognized religious body.
The court ruled that the Millers were guilty of child endangerment as prohibited by the first sentence of § 2919.22. In addition, it
determined that their conduct was covered by the second sentence of
that paragraph which states that there is no violation of the parental
duty of care if spiritual means through prayer alone are utilized in
treating a physical illness consistent with the tenets of a recognized
religious body. However, the court found the second sentence unconstitutional. Citing the opinion in State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Mis. 2d
43 (1984), the court found that the statute violated the first amendment by creating an impermissible relationship between church and
state. The court also adopted the holding in Miskimens that the statute violated equal protection of the law.
The court found that the provisions of § 2919.22(a) were severable and that the first sentence stood with regard to the second. Without the protection of the second section of the statute, the Millers
would be guilty of a fourth degree felony of child endangerment and
involuntary manslaughter. However, the court concluded that to impose criminal liability on the Millers would violate the constitutional
prohibition on ex post facto laws. However, it ruled that parents prosecuted under similar facts in the future could be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
St. Agnes Hospital v. Riddick, 668 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1987).
A federal district court has rejected a motion by the Chairman of
the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
(ACGME) to dismiss a suit brought against it by St. Agnes Hospital.
The suit challenged the revocation of accreditation of the hospital's
residency training program in obstetrics and gynecology. The hospital claimed that two of the areas in which ACGME had found deficiencies in its programs, tubal surgery and family planning, were
areas in which it was precluded from participating because of its religious philosophy. It charged ACGME with conspiracy to violate its
civil rights, violation of federal civil rights acts, and deprivation of its
first and fourteenth amendment rights.
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After concluding that state action existed in the case, the court
found that the plaintiff had stated a sufficient cause of action to survive a motion to dismiss. The court first addressed the hospital's
claim that ACGME had participated in a conspiracy to deprive St.
Agnes of its constitutional free exercise rights in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). It found that the decision in Ward v. Connor, 567
F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982), that religious groups who were subjected to discriminatory animus constituted a protected class under § 1985(3), was still controlling on the
question of the applicability of § 1985(3) to claims of class-based
discrimination.
The court next addressed St. Agnes' claim that the withdrawal of
its accreditation violated Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 20-214(b)
(1986). The statute provides that a hospital cannot be required to
permit abortion or sterilization procedures to be performed within its
facilities. Further, such refusal cannot form the basis for discriminatory or retaliatory measures against the hospital. The court acknowledged the defendant's contention that there was a distinction between
recriminatory actions and those with an academic basis. However, it
found that the hospital had stated sufficient allegations to survive a
motion to dismiss.
The court recognized that retaliations for refusing to perform
abortions could take many forms, including withdrawal of accreditation. However, it ruled that the scope of § 20-214(b) was limited to
situations where the consequences cited were directly related to the
refusal to permit the performance of the procedures. Therefore, it
stated that the hospital would lose its claim on the merits if it was
shown that the loss of accreditation was due to factors other than its
refusal to permit sterilizations and abortions. Moreover, the court
stressed that St. Agnes was required to permit its residents to be
trained in certain procedures if the training could be conducted without the actual procedures being performed at St. Agnes.
XI.

CHILD CUSTODY/VISITATION

Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. Apr. 16, 1987).
The North Dakota Supreme Court has determined that a trial
court erred in prohibiting a divorced father from taking his children
to church services during visitation periods. James Hanson challenged a trial court's visitation restriction which prohibited him from
taking his children to services of the Pentecostal Apostolic Church.
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He and his former wife, Marilyn Verjohn Hanson, were Catholics at
the time of their marriage. However, shortly before the divorce,
James became a member of the Pentecostal Apostolic Church. The
trial court reasoned that James' attempts to "press his new faith upon
the children" created stress for the children. Further, it found that
forcing the children to attend services with their father could damage
the relationship with their father.
The state supreme court noted that statutory law directed that
visitation orders be designed to enable the noncustodial parent to
maintain a parent-child relationship which was beneficial to the child,
absent a showing that the visitation would endanger the child's physical or emotional health.
The court cited various authorities, including Munoz v. Munoz,
49 Wash. 2d 810, 489 P.2d 1122 (1971), where the Washington
Supreme Court held that courts were required to maintain strict impartiality with regard to the parents' religious beliefs, and should not
interfere with the religious instruction offered by either parent except
on a clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs
affected the child's welfare.
In the present case, the court recited testimony offered by the
children's mother that they did not enjoy visiting their father because
he had told them that they were "not religious," that the "Catholic
church believes in cannibalism," and that the "Catholic church and
Lutheran church taught false doctrine." She had also indicated that
the boys were upset by the tension created by the conflict in their
parents' religious beliefs.
While their father's attempts to press his new faith on the children could potentially strain the relationship, the court found that the
evidence fell short of "a clear and affirmative showing of physical or
emotional harm to the children," sufficient to justify restrictions on
James' visitation rights.
Sina v. Sina, 402 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1987).
A Minnesota court of appeals denied David Sina's motion to allow his three children to accompany him to church. In a custody
agreement between Sina and the children's mother, Janet, the children (who were between the ages of 11 and 13) were to be raised in
the mother's Lutheran faith and exposed to the father's Catholic faith.
David subsequently changed churches and filed various motions seeking to be allowed to take the children to his new church. The trial
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court held that exposure to a third religion would be confusing and
detrimental to the children.
The court of appeals affirmed. While parents have a first amendment right to expose their children to their religion, when the parents
agree to religious training in a custody agreement they put the issue of
the children's best interests before the court. The court found three
factors which weighed against exposing the children to a third religion. First, the original provision for religious training was consistent
with the pattern established under the marriage. Second, since
David's church services are at the same time as the Lutheran church,
the children would be denied their primary religious training. Finally, it was not in the best interest of the children to introduce them
to a third religion which would interfere with the full concentration
and participation necessary for preparation for confirmation in the
Lutheran church. Since the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous, its decision must be upheld.
In re Marriageof Swofford, 48 Wash. App. 196, 737 P.2d 1319
(June 11, 1987).
A Washington appellate court has affirmed a trial court's order
modifying a joint custody provision of a divorce decree. Kristie Murphy (Swofford), mother of Lindsey, successfully moved for the modification of a custody order and was awarded sole custody of Lindsey
with reasonable visitation to the father, David Swofford. David appealed, claiming that the court used the wrong statutory standard for
modification of a custody order and that the court's findings were not
supported by sufficient evidence. Because of the mother's remarriage
and new residence in Oregon, the lower court found that the original
decree awarding weekly alternating physical custody to each parent
was no longer appropriate.
The appellate court agreed with the lower court that most of the
applicable statutory considerations indicated that the present environment was not the best for Lindsey. The lower court had validly expressed concern over the relationship between the mother and the
child following the mother's "disfellowship" from the father's church.
The lower court's concerns were based on testimony about the moral
obligation of church members to disassociate themselves from the
mother. Reviewing the lower court's determination, the appellate
court found no first amendment violation because the lower court had
made it clear that it was not criticizing the religion or doctrine in-
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volved. It was concerned with the atmosphere that was created based
on the disfellowship of the mother, noting that it was the duty of each
parent to foster loving relationship between the child and the other
parent. By awarding the mother custody, the lower court also determined that some of the obstacles created by the disfellowship would
be eliminated, thus encouraging a better parent-child relationship.
The dissent noted that the appellate court entered several findings regarding David's religion and its possible effect on the child's
relationship with her mother. Moreover, it noted that religious beliefs
may be considered in the custody decision only to the extent that they
will jeopardize the mental health or physical safety of the child, and
that reasonable and substantial likelihood of immediate or future impairment must be shown. In re Marriageof Hadeen, 27 Wash. App.
556, 579, 619 P.2d 374 (1980). The dissenting judge concluded that it
was clear from the record that one of the determinative factors was
the father's religious beliefs. In the absence of a finding that the father's religious beliefs posed a threat to the mental or physical welfare
of the child, the dissent said it was improper for the court to consider
the father's religious involvement as an ingredient in its decision to
modify a custody order.
XII.

PRISONER RIGHTS

Feigley v. Jeffes, 104 Pa. Commw. 540, 522 A.2d 179 (Mar. 12,
1987).
Inmate George Feigley sought a court order to compel prison
officials to allow him visitation with a Ms. Sandra Good, whom he
described as a religious advisor. The court denied his request.
Section 1 of the Act of June 11, 1879, P.L. 140, 61 P.S. § 121,
provides that "all persons confined or detained in any prison... shall
have the privilege of practicing the religion of their choice, and shall
be at liberty to secure for that purpose the services of any minister
connected with any religious denomination in the state .... " Title 37
Pa. Code § 93.6(b)(2) (1985), provides that "each inmate will be permitted to select a religious advisor from the outside community who
has received endorsement from the recognized faith group authority.
This person will be permitted to visit the inmate on an individual basis in accordance with general rules governing visitation."
The court acknowledged that prison officials have wide latitude
in administering prison affairs. While the discretion is not so broad as
to allow prison officials to ignore constitutionally guaranteed rights,
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federal courts have recognized that a prisoner's right to practice his
religion was not absolute and that officials could restrict the exercise
of an inmate's constitutional rights if such was necessary to facilitate
some legitimate objective.
The court focused on the general visitation rules which specified
that "if a visit is a threat to the security and order of the institution,
the visit may be terminated or disallowed." 37 Pa. Code § 93.3(i)(1).
Moreover, the court found that these regulations provided that "visitation may be restricted or suspended or special security precautions
imposed for violation of visiting rules or as warranted by the temperament of the inmate involved." 37 Pa.. Code 93.3(i)(4).
XIII.

CLERGY-PARISHIONER PRIVILEGE

Rivers v. Rivers, 292 S.C. 21, 354 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. Mar. 23,
1987).
In an action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, the South Carolina Court of Appeals has affirmed a family court
decision in favor of a divorced wife against the woman her ex-husband subsequently married. Helen Elizabeth Rivers brought suit
against Loretta Altman Pinion Rivers, after Loretta married Helen's
ex-husband, Malcolm. Loretta appealed from the family court's order
on the basis that the lower court erred in finding the clergy-penitent
privilege applicable to communications between Helen and an ordained minister who provided marriage counseling. Loretta also
charged that Helen should have been unable to recover damages for
both criminal conversation and alienation of affections, and that the
trial court erred in denying a motion for a new trial on the criminal
conversation claim.
Loretta contended that the trial judge abused his discretion in
applying the clergy-penitent privilege to confidential communications
between Helen and her marriage counselor. Helen had received counseling from Dr. Paul Carlson, a psychologist, who is associated with a
pastoral counseling service at the Trenholm Road United Methodist
Church. The trial court granted Carlson's request that he be excused
from testifying on the basis of the clergy-penitent privilege. He described the counseling program as under the "auspices of the church"
and as a "service provided by the church for helping persons who
[were] having difficulties in their marriages . . . ." The trial judge
determined that the communications between Helen and Carlson
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were confidential since he was "a minister and working as part of a
church program ......

The appeals court noted that clergy confidentiality was of statutory rather than common law origin. The applicable law, S.C. Code
Ann. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985), excuses clergy from giving testimony disclosing any confidential communication "properly entrusted
to him in his professional capacity and necessary and proper to enable
him to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual
course of practice or discipline of his church or religious body." The
statute requires that four conditions be established before the clergypenitent privilege was applicable. The party claiming the privilege
has the burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to establish the existence of the privilege. The existence of the privilege is a question of
fact committed to the trial judge and should not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion.
The court found that the first two statutory requirements were
clearly met: Carlson considered Helen's communications to be confidential, and he was a Protestant minister. It also found the third element present: the confidential communications during marriage
counseling were made to Carlson in his capacity as a clergy man. It
noted that decisions regarding marriage frequently involved spiritual
and moral considerations, and that such considerations were presumably the motivation for the church permitting Carlson to provide
marriage counseling services under its auspices. While Carlson undoubtedly acted both as a therapist and as clergyman in the counseling sessions, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine to
what extent he acted in either role. In view of the practical difficulty
in distinguishing between the two functions, the court deemed all confidential communications between Helen and Carlson to have been
made in his professional capacity as a clergyman. With regard to the
fourth requirement, it found that the communications were made in
the function of Carlson's office according to the usual practice of the
church. Further, it found that through the counseling service, the
church had made marriage counseling a practice of the church.
Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in applying the
privilege.
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XIV.

TRADE NAMES/COPYRIGHTS

Christian Science Board of Directorsof the First Church of Christ,
Scientist v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297, 520 A.2d 1347 (Feb. 23, 1987).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld an appeals court decision refusing to enjoin a church which broke from the Church of
Christ, Scientist from using the words "Christian Science" in its
name. The court ruled that the words were the generic name of a
religion which could not be appropriated as a trademark. Following a
break over a doctrinal dispute, the First Church of Christ, Scientist,
Plainfield, terminated its corporate status and reincorporated as a
general religious corporation, adopting the name "Independent Christian Science Church of Plainfield, New Jersey." The mother church
brought suit to enjoin the Plainfield church form using titles referring
to Christian Science, Christ, Scientist or other similar terms. It argued that the terms used by the Plainfield church were so similar to
those used by the mother church as to be likely to cause confusion,
mistake and deception, to constitute false representation, and to result
in unfair appropriation of the mother church's name, reputation, and
goodwill. It also claimed that use of the terms violated federal trademark law.
A trial court granted injunctive relief to the mother church. The
Plainfield church appealed. Pending appeal, it proposed to use the
name Plainfield Community Church, An Independent Church Practicing Christian Science. The trial court ordered that the second line
of the title, if used at all, be used only as an explanatory phrase rather
than as part of the name. An appeals court reversed the trail court in
part, finding that the mother church did not have exclusive use of the
phrase "Christian Science" when used as part of a name of a church.
However, it found that the term Christian Science was protectable
when used as part of the name "Christian Science Reading Room."
Thus, it enjoined the Plainfield church from using any variations of
Christ, Scientist or Christian Science in connection with a reading
room, but reversed the trial court finding with respect to the Plainfield
church's use of Christian Science in its name.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court decision. It found two facts significant in determining the outcome of the
case. First, that the Christian Science religion and the organized
church were conceptionally separate, and, second, that the religion
pre-dated the organization. Therefore, anyone who practiced Christian Science was entitled to use the term in its church name.
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In reaching its decision that the Plainfield church could use the
term Christian Science, the court found that the term was the generic
name for churches in which the Christian Science religion is practiced. Generic names are in the public domain and, therefore, are free
for all to use. Because a generic name could not be appropriated as a
trademark, the mother church could not appropriate the common
name of a religion from the public domain.
In addition, the court observed that many separate religious
groups sharing a common element in their names were once single
denominations. It found the facts at issue here similar to those in
several other cases in which the right of seceding churches to use the
name of their religious faith in their church name was upheld
notwithstanding the objections of the parent denomination. Moreover, it found that the case was distinguishable from those cases
which had enjoined dissident church groups from using the name
identical or nearly identical to the names that they used in their prior
affiliation. It noted that the church had selected a name different
from the name it had used while a branch of the denomination.
In view of the fact that the injunction had been dissolved, it was
unnecessary to explicitly rule on the Plainfield church's claims that
upholding the injunction would violate the first amendment free
speech and religion clauses. However, in dictum the court commented that, were the injunction upheld as a valid trademark, there
would be no violation of free speech rights. It also expressed grave
reservation as to whether an injunction would violate the establishment clause or the Plainfield church's free exercise rights.
Religious Technology Center v. Scott, 660 F. Supp. 515 (C.D. Cal.

Mar. 11, 1987).
A federal district court has denied a preliminary injunction to
the Church of Scientology International that would have prohibited
the Church of the New Civilization (New Church) from using certain
documents which the Scientologists regard as religious scriptures.
The court ruled that the Scientologists had failed to make a sufficient
showing of likelihood of success on the merits and had not shown that
the balance of hardships justified the preliminary injunction.
The suit arose following the alleged 1983 theft of certain documents from the Church of Scientology, including a series of bulletins
describing a procedure known as "New Era Dianetics for Operating
Thetans" (NOTs). The Scientologists alleged that the documents
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were copied by the New Church. They initiated this suit in 1985
claiming theft of trade secrets and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The trial court initially granted a motion for a preliminary injunction barring the New
Church's use of the material. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
dissolved the injunction. The circuit court ruled that private plaintiffs
were not entitled to injunctions under the civil RICO statute and that
trade secret protection was unavailable since the documents at issue
were religious scriptures and did not have independent economic
value.
The district court initially rejected the argument that
Scientology's copyright of its material was valid. It determined that a
certificate of copyright registration was prima facie evidence of the
validity of the NOTs copyright, and that the New Church had not
succeeded in rebutting the presumption that L. Ron Hubbard was the
author of the materials. After reviewing the evidence, including the
New Church's claim that one of its members was actually the author
of the materials, the court reasoned that the New Church had created
only doubt as to whether Hubbard owned the copyright as an author
or as an employer in a work-for-hire situation. The court also rejected claims that the Hubbard estate had perpetrated fraud in obtaining special relief from the copyright office's deposit requirement,
and that the Scientologists were estopped from seeking the injunction
by their failure to assert the copyright claim earlier.
Addressing the issue of whether the New Church's materials infringed on the NOTs copyright, the Scientologists would have to
demonstrate that the New Church had access to the copyrighted
materials and that there was substantial similarity between NOTs and
the New Church's materials. The court found that the New Church
had access to the NOTs materials, regardless of whether they had
obtained stolen copies of the materials, and that there were substantial
similarities. Nonetheless, the court found that the similarities were
not so clear as to necessitate a finding that the Scientologists had
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The
court stated that an extrinsic test was utilized to determine whether
the ideas expressed in the works were similar, and an intrinsic test was
employed to ascertain if the expression of those ideas was substantially similar.
While the religious procedures described in the NOTs and the
New Church's materials required a certain level of similarity of expression, the court found that such similarities did not constitute
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copyright infringement if they were dictated by the nature of the process described. Thus, the court searched for other similarities, not a
result of similarities of the procedures described.
With respect to the extrinsic test, the court found what the New
Church had admitted that the ideas expressed in the two works were
substantially similar. The court rejected the Scientologists' contention that application of the extrinsic test would impermissibly entangle the court in a determination of religious doctrine. The court
commented that the argument implied that religious scriptures could
not be copyrighted. To the contrary, such a conclusion would violate
the first amendment and involve the court in the even more intrusive
task of determining whether certain works were religious scriptures.
The court observed that neutral principles of law could be applied to
resolve religious disputes. In this case, the court concluded that a
linguistic, rather than theological, inquiry was necessary. It stated
that it need not evaluate any religious differences between the two
works, but only whether similarities or differences predominated.
Applying the intrinsic test, the court concluded that the ordinary
reasonably person would not find the two materials substantially similar in expression. While the materials shared a number of similarities
of expression, the bulk of the New Church's text consisted of text not
found in the NOTs. Although a portion of the New Church's materials appeared to paraphrase the NOTs, the actual percentage of the
text that appeared to have been copied verbatim was very small.
The court determined that the balance weighed against the issuance of the injunction, since the injunction could irreparably injure
the New Church. Although the New Church could not be enjoined
from practicing the procedures described in its materials, the injunction could have a chilling effect because of concern that whatever
materials are used might violate the injunction. It noted that the previous injunction had put the New Church's Advanced Ability Center
out of business.
Since the New Church's constitutional right to practice its religion was at issue, a very strong showing of hardship to the Scientologists would be required to justify the injunction. It concluded that the
Scientologists' concerns were not sufficient to justify that burden. The
Scientologists had identified several hardships to itself including that:
1) confidential scriptures would be made public; 2) they would suffer
pecuniary damage through the loss of parishioners' fees; and 3) they
would lose control over the integrity of their materials. The court
reasoned that concern regarding the confidentiality of the scriptures
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was lessened since the New Church had expressed opposition to the
publication of the advanced technology of Scientology and could
make the technology public if it so desired without violating copyright
restrictions. The concern over possible loss of revenues was insufficient due to the uncertainty regarding how much of the loss could be
attributed to copyright infringement. Injunctive relief was unnecessary since monetary damages were available. Finally, with respect to
concern for the integrity of the materials, since the New Church had
advertised its procedure to be similar to that offered by the Scientologists, the Scientologists' reputation could suffer injury if the New
Church's material was actually less effective than the Scientologists'.
However, it found that the injury would result from the New
Church's ability to employ a procedure not subject to copyright protection rather than from infringement on the copyright.
XV.

ASCENDING LIABILITY

Maryland Casualty Company v. Huger, 728 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct.
App. Mar. 3, 1987).
A Missouri court of appeals has affirmed a trial court's determination that Maryland Casualty Company was not liable for injuries
sustained by Lt. John Becker in arresting Rev. James J. Danis, a Roman Catholic priest, during his activities at an abortion clinic. Maryland Casualty Company, the insurer of the St. Louis Archdiocese,
brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment concerning its obligation
under a general liability policy. Becker allegedly suffered a herniated
disc while arresting the late Rev. Danis during an anti-abortion protest. Becker filed suit for personal injury and loss of consortium
against the St. Louis Archdiocese and a defendant ad litem for Danis,
Bernard Huger. The trial court concluded that Danis' anti-abortion
activities were not covered under the insurance policy, and therefore
the insurance company had no obligation to pay any judgment rendered against Danis.
The policy at issue provided coverage to the St. Louis Archbishop and his successors in their individual capacities. It also covered all priests within the St. Louis Archdiocese when acting within
their respective duties. In upholding the trial court's determination,
the appeals court ruled that the injuries Becker sustained did not give
rise to liability on the part of the insurance company because Danis
was not acting within the scope of his duties.
Testimony by church officials concerning the church's teaching

JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION

[Vol. 6

on abortion and the duties of the priests indicated that, while the
church is strongly opposed to abortion and a priest is a priest at all
times, a priest had no duty to protest at abortion clinics. The St.
Louis Diocese Archbishop testified concerning church teachings on
the life and ministry of priests. He testified that a priest could teach
anywhere he wished, but the most appropriate place was in the pulpit.
The Archbishop also testified that a priest was not obligated to undertake such action as blocking the entrance way to an abortion clinic,
and in such a situation he would simply be acting according to his
own personal judgment.
Cardinal Cardberry testified with regard to church teachings
concerning Right to Life and church documents regarding abortion.
He stated that such teachings were part of the moral teachings of the
church and that priests were charged with the task of preaching the
Gospel and the sanctity of life. He further stated that lawfully counseling women against abortion at abortion clinics would be consistent
with the teachings of the Vatican Counsel. However, he stated that
peaceful picketing by priests at abortion clinics did not fall within the
purview of church documents.
RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE

Cahill v. Public Service Commission, 69 N.Y.2d 265, 506 N.E.2d
187, 513 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Dec. 19, 1986), cert.filed, 55 U.S.L.W.
2364 (U.S. Nos. 86-2043 & 2044 June 22, 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has been asked to review a
New York Court of Appeals opinion that certain rate-setting acts by
the New York State Public Service Commission (PSC) were unconstitutional. The state court held that in setting rates which compelled a
utility customer to pay for charitable contributions made by the PSC,
the utility's actions constituted governmental conduct which established possible first amendment violations.
Joseph Cahill, a Roman Catholic, alleged that as a consequence
of PSC policy, he was compelled to contribute to religious institutions
espousing beliefs inconsistent with his own, to charities supporting the
right to an abortion contrary to his moral and religious beliefs, and to
causes which he found objectionable on both personal and political
grounds. In ruling that Cahill established an adequate claim of improper state action, the court emphasized that the proceeding involved the governmental conduct of a state agency as opposed to the
private conduct of a utility in which the state had merely acquiesced.
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Because the utility was a monopoly, the customer had to pay the required rates or be deprived of his right to utility service.
In re Green, 73 Bankr. 893 (W.D. Mich. May 21, 1987).
A federal bankruptcy court has ruled that the confirmation of a
Chapter 13 monthly budget plan that permitted the debtor to tithe did
not violate the establishment clause, and, indeed, was required by the
free exercise clause. The State of Michigan, an unsecured creditor of
Norma J. Green, challenged the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
which permitted her to tithe $140 per month to her church. The state
contended that confirmation of the plan would violate the establishment clause by favoring religions which require tithing over those that
do not.
The court rejected the state's argument, evaluating the case
under the Lemon test. The court found that the bankruptcy code had
a secular legislative purpose of relieving the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness by permitting him to start free from
the obligations and responsibilities of past business misfortunes. Specifically, it found that Congress had not enacted the statute with an
intent of providing "disguised aid to churches."
The court also found that the primary effect of the statute did not
advance religion. Although payment of the tithe probably would advance the work of Green's church, the tithe transferred Green's property and not any government funds to the church. Thus, any benefit
conferred on the church resulted from Green's private choice which
was interposed between the court and the church. The court stated
that "such an attenuated benefit cannot be deemed to confer the imprimatur of state approval of any particular religion or upon religion
as a whole." The court also ruled that the plan did not violate the
excessive entanglement prohibition. It concluded that because the
tithe went directly from Green to her church, and did not pass
through the trustee's or require the trustee to oversee how the church
spent the money, there was no need for comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing church surveillance.
The court found that denial of conformation of the plan would
violate Green's free exercise of religion. The court held that denying
confirmation of the plan on the basis of Green's tithe would "deny her
the benefits of the bankruptcy code because of conduct mandated by
her religious beliefs," and that conditioning confirmation upon her
agreement not to tithe would pressure her to violate her beliefs. The
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court noted that such burdens could only be justified by proof of a
compelling state interest and that such proof had not been produced
here.
Washington v. Wendt, 47 Wash. App. 427, 735 P.2d 1334 (Apr. 16,
1987), reconsiderationdenied (May 21, 1987), review denied (Sept.
1, 1987).
A Washington appellate court has affirmed a lower court ruling
that it was proper for the Department of Labor and Industries to
bring an action on the part of an injured worker who declined to bring
the action due to his religious beliefs. Roger Heinrich was a minister
and trust officer in the Seventh-day Adventist Church. While working he was assaulted by Victor Wendt and suffered severe injury. The
department paid Heinrich worker's compensation benefits. For religious reasons, Heinrich assigned his cause of action to the department
which brought this action against Wendt. At trial, the jury found for
the department and Wendt appealed.
Wendt contended that the department was not the real party in
interest and therefore not entitled to bring the action for damages in
its own name. The appellate court ruled that the department was
properly allowed to proceed under its own name as it was the assignee
of Heinrich's cause of action.
Wendt's constitutional argument centered around his belief that
the department's expenditures made in pursuit of the action impermissibly established religion, thus violating Article 1, § 11 of the
Washington Constitution. That provisions requires in pertinent part:
"4no public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment .

. . ."

Wendt pointed out that Heinrich as-

signed his cause of action based upon his religious beliefs which do
not permit him to bring a lawsuit in his own name. Furthermore,
under Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.050 (1985), Heinrich will receive the
excess of any amount recovered by the department above its own expenses. Because Heinrich would not have otherwise received this
money, Wendt argued that the department's pursuit of the action had
the effect of supporting religion.
In determining whether a statute impermissibly establishes religion under Article I, § 11, the state supreme court had adopted the
three-prong Lemon test. In applying the Lemon test, the court concluded that: 1) the industrial insurance act was enacted for a secular

145]

1987 COURT SURVEY

purpose; 2) the act has no effect on religion at all, as it is religiously
neutral; and 3) the act does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion since it has no connection with religion except as a
coincidental connection in the present case. Moreover, the appellate
court emphasized that it could not find any governmental sponsorship
of religion under the terms of the statute in question. The court stated
that the reason a person assigns a cause of action to the department is
irrelevant for purposes of the act's administration. The court found
that the fact a person coincidentally assigns a cause of action under
the statute for religious reasons does not mean the act is any less
"neutral" with respect to religion.
XVII.

JUSTICIABILITY

Phelps v. Carlin, No. 85-4322-S (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 1987).
A federal district court has granted a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of a Kansas moment of silence statute. Public school students sought a
declaration that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5308a (1982), was unconstitutional and an injunction preventing teachers from utilizing the statute.
The statute allowed a classroom teacher and students to observe a
brief period of silence at the opening of every school day. This period
was not to be conducted as a religious exercise, but was to be an opportunity for silent prayer or for silent reflection on the anticipated
activities of the day. The students contended that they and other elementary school children were subjected to religious exercises in the
Topeka public schools. They also argued that the absence of established guidelines concerning the application of the statute gave teachers free reign to conduct religious exercises.
The court addressed the issue of whether the students had standing to bring the lawsuit. According to the court, this would require a
showing that the students had experienced, or were in immediate danger of experiencing, moments of sectarian silence. The court found no
objective evidence that the occasions of classroom silence were moments intended for prayer. Rather, the court took notice that quiet
times constituted an accepted teaching practice utilized to calm students down after physically or emotionally stimulating activities, thus
allowing the students to get back into a studying frame of mind. Furthermore, that even if a teacher bows his head during the quiet time,
absent any other objective indication of religious intent, only the stu-
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dents' parents' imaginations would convert such an act into a prayer
service.
The facts demonstrated that no student has personally suffered
actual constitutional injury, nor could any threatened injury be reasonably anticipated. The court determined that the lawsuit represented no more than a generalized grievance more appropriately
addressed by the Kansas Legislature. Therefore, it refused to take up
the constitutionality of § 72-5308a.
For a similar case, see Phelps v. Hayden, Civ. Action No. 854322-S (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 1987) (students' claim dismissed for lack of
standing).
American Baptist Church v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 1987).
A federal district court has ruled that various religious organizations alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss on the
basis that they lacked standing and/or failed to assert claims upon
which relief could be granted. However, the court ruled that a second
plaintiff group composed of three Central American refugee service
organizations had failed to demonstrate that they satisfied standing
requirements.
The case was brought by the two plaintiff groups challenging the
government's prosecution of religious sanctuary workers under 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a). The religious organizations sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions preventing the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from prosecuting individuals affiliated with the religious sanctuary movement and a declaratory judgment stating that
they were entitled to provide assistance to El Savador and Guatemala
refugees. The refugee service organizations claimed that the refugees
were entitled to temporary refuge in this country. As a result, the
INS's discriminatory application of immigration law violated the refugees' fifth amendment rights to equal protection of the law. They
also alleged that the government had recklessly endangered the refugees' lives by sending them to countries where they would be subjected to wrongful death, battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional harm. They sought an injunction against the arrest and
deportation of El Salvadoran and Guatamalean refugees until human
rights violations in those countries had ceased. They also sought a
declaration that the refugees were entitled to temporary refuge in the
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United States until the condition no longer existed in their home
countries.
Addressing the standing of the religious organizations, the district court found that the religious organizations had alleged a sufficient injury to meet standing requirements. The organizations
claimed that the prosecutions of sanctuary workers and the threat of
additional prosecutions had the purpose and effect of preventing and
discouraging the organizations' staff from participating in sanctuary
work, thus directly interfering with the performance of religious duties. They argued that because of the fear of prosecution some individuals were deterred from rendering assistance to the refugees,
thereby interfering with the religious organizations' performance of
their religious duties and the exercise of their first amendment rights.
They charged that the interference with those rights was directly attributable to the INS action and could be remedied by a grant of judicial relief. The court found that such claims presented sufficient
allegations. In so doing, it rejected the government's claim that the
plaintiffs had only alleged a subjective fear of prosecution and failed
to show that they or any of their members were imminently
threatened with prosecution.
However, the court concluded that the religious organizations
did not meet the requirements of associational standing, since it
would be necessary for the individual members of the organization to
participate in the lawsuit in order to evaluate the centrality and
sincerity of each individual's religious belief.
The court next determined that religious organizations had asserted a cognizable claim under the free exercise clause under a threepart test announced by the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Pacific Press
PublishingAssociation, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). The test requires evaluation of: 1) the magnitude of the statute's impact on the
exercise of religious beliefs; 2) the existence of a compelling state interest justifying the burden imposed upon the exercise of religious beliefs; and 3) the extent to which the recognition of an exemption from
a statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the
suit. It found that they had made sufficient allegations to demonstrate
a substantial impact upon their exercise of religious beliefs. Although
the court concluded that the statute served a compelling state interest
in enforcement of the nation's immigrations laws, it also found there
was a factual question with respect to whether recognizing an exemption from the immigration statute would impede the governmental
objectives advanced by the law. Here it found that the plaintiffs'
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claim that they could produce evidence that the sanctuary movement
posed little threat to the enforcement of immigration laws was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

